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Abstract  
 
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that in markets with 
standards competition, strong network effects can make the strong grow 
stronger and, in some circumstances, even “tip” the market towards a 
single, winner-take-all standard.  We theorize that in the presence of low 
cost conversion technologies and digital content, the tendency towards 
market dominance can be lessened to the point where multiple 
incompatible standards are viable. Our hypotheses are empirically 
examined in the context of the flash memory card market where both 
network effects and high quality conversion are present. The results show 
that the availability of digital converters reduces the price premium of the 
leading flash card formats more than of the minority formats. Therefore, 
producers of the non-dominant standards can be better off with the 
provision of conversion technology as this technology neutralizes the 
impact of network effects that would have otherwise been more potent. 
We discuss both the social and private implications of our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Network effects arise in many information technology (IT) markets where the value of a 
product or service demands interoperability. These network effects make the choice of a 
technology standard or platform to be an important strategic decision to both consumers and 
firms (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Economides, 1996). Examples of this phenomenon include 
computer hardware, operating systems, application software, and, more recently, popular instant 
messengers and social networks. In addition to ease of communications, a widely compatible 
product may also give rise to longer product lifecycle, better product support and services, and a 
greater variety of complementary goods. In most traditional contexts, when quality and 
performance are similar across competing standards and consumers are increasingly aware of 
these compatibility benefits they are more likely to opt for a product that adopts a more popular 
standard, which, in turn, creates a virtuous cycle for the leading formats and helps the strong 
grow stronger (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Consequently, when multiple incompatible 
technologies coexist, firms often have to compete ex ante for ex post market power, as once the 
market falls into this positive feedback loop, the growth of the leading format often becomes 
irreversible until it achieves market dominance. This type of market evolution has been 
documented in the VHS and Betamax “standards wars” (Cusumano et al., 1992, Park, 2004), the 
adoption of the DVD format (Dranove and Gandal, 2003), and the markets for U.S. desktop 
operating systems and office productivity software (Bresnahan, 2001). 
However, as we enter a “digital era”, a new and different pattern of competition seems to be 
emerging from several digital goods markets. Despite strong demand for compatibility, these 
markets do not tip towards a single standard, nor do we see a significant advantage of the 
incumbent over the new entrants. Witness, for example, the lack of standardization seen in 
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markets for digital media files (Real Media, Windows Media, QuickTime, AVI, MPEG), digital 
photography (JPEG, GIF, TIFF, PNG), and flash memory cards (Compact Flash, SmartMedia, 
Secure Digital, Memory Stick, XD Picture, Multimedia). 
Flash memory is a class of non-volatile, electrically rewritable memory that was introduced 
into the consumer electronic market in 19941. With the capability to store large amounts of data 
in digital format, fast read/write speeds, and compact size, it has emerged as the primary storage 
media of various digital electronic devices such as digital cameras, digital camcorders, mobile 
phones, PDAs, audio players, etc. Over the past decade the flash memory market has become 
one of the fastest growing sectors in the IT industry. According to market research firm IDC, 
flash memory revenue is expected to reach $18.7 billion in 2010, up from a record $10.6 billion 
in 20052. This growth may not be surprising given the rapid growth of the digital consumer 
electronics market and the heavy reliance of these digital devices on memory cards for data 
storage and transfer. What is surprising is the variety of incompatible card formats that exist in 
the market. In spite of apparent network effects, there are currently more than six incompatible 
formats and a number of variants deriving from each format. More remarkably, as depicted in 
Figure 1, the SmartMedia and Compact Flash formats, despite their first mover advantage (more 
than a 70% combined share in 2002), have both lost their once leading positions to the Secure 
Digital format, the current leader with a market share of 37%. The rest of the market is split by a 
variety of standards including: Memory Stick and Memory Stick Pro (combined 22% share), XD 
Picture (12% share) and Multimedia cards (5% share) with little evidence of market 
consolidation.  
                                                 
1 http://www.sandisk.com/Oem/DocumentInfo.aspx?DocumentID=1340  
2 http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/2006-06-04-storage-drive_x.htm  
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Figure 1: Flash Memory Card Monthly Market Share – January 2003 to August 2006 
The characteristics of the flash memory card market imply the presence of network effects. A 
consumer is better off the more people who adopt a flash card format that is compatible with the 
ones he or she owns. A widely adopted flash card format allows users of compatible digital 
products to easily transfer data from one to the other (i.e. between two PDAs or from a digital 
camera to a digital photo printer). Furthermore, as in the case of VHS/Betamax where an 
increase in the market share of one type of video tape format will increase the number of studios 
and video tape rental stores that support this format, an increase in the demand for one type of 
flash memory card will increase the variety of digital products that are compatible with it, which 
in turn will raise demand for that type of flash memory card. However, this self-reinforcing loop 
is not clearly observed in the flash memory market to date. Early success does not necessarily 
translate into future success as the incumbent formats have been experiencing a decline in market 
share and new formats continue to emerge, even as the market grows. Given this distinct market 
outcome one may ask the questions: what distinguishes the flash memory card market from the 
other markets with similar characteristics? Why is there little evidence of standards convergence 
in a market that desires compatibility and would benefit from network effects? 
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In contrast to other IT Markets studied in the network effects literature, for flash memory 
cards, one candidate explanation involves both the digital nature of flash memory products and 
the associated presence of conversion technologies. Flash memory cards can store any 
information in digital format, which means that their contents can be transferred without loss of 
quality. Additionally, there is a widespread availability of inexpensive PC- and USB-based 
converters3, allowing for easy conversion of data between various card formats. The existence of 
these conversion technologies suggests that nearly full compatibility may be achieved across 
different formats without compromising product performance or features (Farrell et al., 1992), an 
aspect not typically observed in other markets with network effects. For example, converting 
between VHS and Beta standards was costly and resulted in signal loss (Cusumano et al., 1992).  
In this study, we analyze the flash memory market and empirically examine the role of digital 
converters in shaping the competition in this market. Our results suggest that in the presence of 
low cost conversion technologies and digital content, the probability of market dominance as 
driven by network effects can be lessened to the point where multiple incompatible standards are 
viable. We find that, in the flash memory market the increasing adoption of digital converters 
reduces the impact of the installed base on the product price premium, despite evidence of 
network effects. In particular, digital converters reduce the price premium of the leading formats 
more than they do the minority formats. The impact of network effects is less significant when 
there is greater adoption of digital converters.  
These findings have important theoretical and managerial implications for the growing 
literature on network effects in IT markets. Our study is one of the first attempts in the literature 
to complement the analytic literature on conversion technologies in markets with standards 
                                                 
3 These converters are also known as multi-format flash memory card readers that have multiple slots for different types of 
incompatible flash cards. Through a USB cable, consumers can read from or write to multiple flash memory cards simultaneously 
from a PC. Currently more than 100 models are available in the market (www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/1197398). 
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competition (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988, Economides, 1989, 1991a, Farrell and Saloner, 1992, 
Choi, 1996, 1997). Although the presence and magnitude of network effects have been 
empirically demonstrated in the literature (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996, Gandal, 1994, 
Gallaugher and Wang, 2002, Asvanund et al., 2004, etc), to the best of our knowledge there has 
not been any empirical work on newer digital goods technologies and the interaction between 
network effects and converters and how the market evolves in this context. Our use of market 
data thus contributes to the existing body of knowledge on network effects by providing unique 
insights into how conversion technologies affect competition in digital markets. 
Our findings on the effects of conversion technologies also have important implications for 
both vendors and consumers. As converters become more popular, consumer perceptions of 
network effects decrease since compatibility can be achieved at a lower cost. Consequently, the 
choice of a product may rely more on other attributes, such as brand and quality attributes, than 
market share. Vendors’ marketing and pricing strategies should adjust accordingly to account for 
this shift in consumer preferences. Thus, the consumer decision making process and the 
interaction between vendors and consumers may change significantly as a result of the 
introduction of converters. 
Finally, from society’s standpoint, the provision of a converter reduces the need to 
compromise between product variety and standardization, especially for markets characterized 
with high consumer heterogeneity. Given that there is still vast disagreement over the tradeoffs 
between market competitiveness and the social benefit of industry wide compatibility, our 
analysis contributes to the debate on standardization in IT markets by enriching the alternative 
choice set of such consideration. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on network effects and 
conversion technologies, providing the theoretical basis for our work. Section 3 presents the 
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conceptual model and hypotheses. In section 4, we describe the data and measures of our key 
variables. The econometric models and results are presented in section 5 and further discussed in 
section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future research.  
2.  Related Literature 
2.1. Network effects and hedonic price models 
Network effects refer to the circumstance in which the net value of the action of consuming 
a good (e.g., subscribing to telephone service) is affected by the number of agents taking 
equivalent actions (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). Both prior research and anecdotal evidence 
have suggested that, in markets with network effects, early success in accumulating a large 
installed base can give rise to a number of strategic advantages. In addition to the positive 
feedback loop generated by self-fulfilling consumer and retailer expectations, empirical research 
has suggested that network effects help to create switching costs to lock-in existing customers 
(Chen and Hitt, 2002, Zhu et al., 2006) and to increase the speed at which market demand grows 
(Economides and Himmelberg, 1995, Kauffman et al., 2000). Other strategic advantages include 
the ability to deter potential entrants (Lee et al., 2003, Suárez and Utterback, 1995) and the 
possibility to control the design interface (Conner, 1995). Moreover, given that network effects 
are often perceived as the consumer’s valuation for a standard (Farrell and Saloner, 1985), a 
stream of empirical research on network effects focuses on estimating the influence of the 
installed base on consumer’s willingness to pay for the dominant standard. Several empirical 
studies have found a price premium for dominant standards in markets for mainframe computers 
(Greenstein, 1993), IBM compatible microcomputers (Hartman, 1989), spreadsheet software 
(Gandal, 1994, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996), databases (Gandal, 1995) and communications 
equipment (Chen and Forman, 2006).  
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Although the above empirical studies differ in their highlighted consequences of network 
effects, the coefficients on their compatibility variables can all be interpreted in the same way - 
as an indication of the perceived value of being part of a larger network. Of particular interest is 
the use of hedonic regression approach in capturing this value.  
The hedonic regression was first applied to IT products by Chow (1967) in estimating the 
annual quality-adjusted price decline in mainframe computers from 1960-1965. As a useful 
method to decompose consumers’ consumption utility into independent valuations of different 
aspects of a product, hedonic regression has been widely employed in estimating the marginal 
benefit of products that include multiple attributes, and is particularly appealing in the empirical 
literature on network effects. By treating various antecedents of network effects such as installed 
base or learning costs as implicit features of a product, hedonic regression allows researchers to 
obtain estimates of the parameter measuring a consumer’s willingness to adopt a standard (or the 
opportunity costs to switch to a different network), controlling for other intrinsic values of a 
product. As the choice of a flash memory card also depends on a variety of considerations other 
than the size of the installed base, such as brand, capacity, and speed, we adopt the hedonic 
model as an appropriate approach to distinguish network effects from the impacts of other factors.  
2.2. Conversion technologies  
An important objective of this research is to analyze the role of digital converters in 
influencing standards competition in markets characterized with network effects. Although the 
extant empirical literature has identified a variety of sources and consequences of network 
effects, very little attention has been devoted to the interaction between conversion technologies 
and technology adoption in markets characterized with standards competition. Most studies on 
this topic rely on either an analytic framework (Farrell and Saloner, 1992, Choi, 1996, 1997) or 
an historical case study (David and Bunn, 1988) to illustrate the effect of converters on 
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technology adoption.  
A major challenge of any empirical study on this topic lies in distinguishing the 
counteracting effects of conversion technologies on product price. In the absence of a common 
interface, converters enable incompatible systems to communicate with each other and hence 
internalize the compatibility benefits that would have been lost without converters. Consumers 
benefit from the provision of converters because converters can increase both product variety 
and the size of the network to which the consumer belongs (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988, 
Economides, 1989). As a result, consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the otherwise 
incompatible products. On the other hand, the presence of converters also reduces the expected 
price premium of the dominant standards as both the relative attractiveness of their products and 
product switching costs decrease due to a lower compatibility barrier (Farrell and Saloner, 1992). 
The installed base of the dominant standards may expand more slowly and competition may 
intensify as the intransient compatibility period extends (Choi, 1996, 1997). At the same time, 
new entrants are more likely to enter the market and to survive the standards war (Liu et al., 
2007).  
Given these complicated interactions, the product price premium is not merely an indicator 
of the perceived value of the installed base as assumed in the classic network effects literature. A 
consumer’s valuation of product compatibility, as measured by product price, should be further 
decomposed into variation due to product installed base, the adoption of conversion technologies, 
as well as the interaction of the two effects. Drawing upon the findings from the above literature, 
we develop a conceptual framework with specific hypotheses to examine the dynamics between 
conversion technologies and the various antecedents and outcomes of network effects. 
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3. Research Model and Hypotheses  
Since the role of conversion technologies is of primary interest when network effects exist, 
identifying the presence and the magnitude of network effects is an important first step in 
evaluating the nature of standards competition in the flash memory card market. In the literature, 
network effects are most commonly evidenced by the price premium of a product format (Berndt 
et al., 2003, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996, Gandal, 1994, 1995, Greenstein, 1993). The price 
premium of a product format is expected to vary positively with the size of the product’s 
installed base. Typically, a larger installed base for a product format confers greater utility to 
consumers. For example, consumers of the same operating system can exchange software 
applications more easily with a larger number of users of the same system. Therefore, because 
the utility of a product increases with the installed base for the product, there will tend to be one 
dominant standard in the market, and the firm offering the leading market standard for the 
product should be able to charge a higher price for it.  However, in contrast to this typical 
scenario, in the flash memory cards market, there is little evidence of standards convergence 
despite consumers’ desire for product compatibility. Clearly, the literature would suggest a 
positive association between the size of the installed base and the flash memory card price, but it 
is possible that the magnitude of the positive network effects is too small to warrant a dominant 
firm market outcome. Regardless of magnitude, we would still expect a positive relationship 
between price and installed based for flash memory cards, such that:  
Hypothesis 1: the price of a flash memory card is positively associated with the size of the 
installed base of the same format.  
We now consider how digital converters would affect the price of flash memory cards. As 
discussed in Section 2, the use of digital converters can affect consumers’ perceptions of product 
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value. With digital converters, consumers of flash memory card products with incompatible 
formats can still exchange content with each other and thereby obtain the benefits of 
compatibility. Thus, digital converters can increase consumption utility across flash memory 
card products of different standards.  This implies that greater adoption of digital converters will 
increase the utility (and thus the price) of flash memory cards, even if the cards are not 
compatible. Therefore:   
Hypothesis 2: the price of a flash memory card is positively associated with the adoption of 
digital converters.  
As we have noted earlier, in a market characterized by standards competition and strong 
network effects, typically one dominant product standard will emerge. Consumers are motivated 
to purchase the dominant standard to obtain the benefits of compatibility with a large installed 
base of other users, and the firm producing the dominant standard will therefore be able to 
charge a price premium for the product. However, by breaking the compatibility barrier across 
competing formats, digital converters can reduce the influence of the dominant standards on 
consumer purchase decisions. When making a technology choice, the wide presence of digital 
converters reduces the consumer’s risk of being stranded on a new, but less popular standard, as 
the chances for survival of a new technology are larger when network effects are less significant. 
In addition, digital converters allow products with different formats to be compatible. As a result, 
when digital converters are present, consumers are not as motivated to purchase a dominant 
standard as there is less benefit from it; this lowers the producer’s price premium. Following this 
logic, in the context of flash memory cards, a greater adoption of digital converters will 
especially affect the price premium of the dominant standard. Producers of flash memory card 
standards with a larger installed base are expected to lose more market power than those with a 
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smaller installed base, as there is less utility from a dominant standard when converters are 
present. Thus, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 3: the adoption of digital converters reduces the impact of the installed base on 
flash memory card prices, such that the price reduction effect is stronger for standards with a 
larger installed base than for standards with a smaller installed base.  
 
Figure 2: Research Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 2 illustrates our conceptual framework for the empirical analysis, along with the 
predicted directions of how installed base, the adoption of digital converters, and their interaction 
will affect the price premium of a flash memory card. 
4. Data and Measures   
4.1. Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we assembled a large panel dataset including data on the products 
and producers in the flash memory card market. The flash memory card market offers a 
particularly appropriate test case for our hypotheses. The market has been quite volatile since 
launched in 1994; different formats have emerged and competed for dominance. The co-
existence of multiple formats, despite the presence of network effects and the possibility to 
convert data without quality loss suggest that this is a market with the potential for dynamics 
significantly different than those previously studied.  
We selected a sample period from 2003 to 2006 for our analysis since this is a critical period 
H3 (–)
H1 (+)
H2 (+) 
Digital Conversion 
Adoption 
Price 
Premium 
Network Effects 
(Installed Base) 
 Capacity, 
Speed,  
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in the development of the flash memory card market during which most of the current formats 
are present. Our primary data were generously provided by the NPD4 research group. This data 
includes detailed information on the monthly retail prices and unit sales data of the major flash 
memory cards and digital converters sold each month by major U.S. retailers from January, 2003 
to August, 2006. To supplement the NPD dataset, we also implemented a software agent which 
automatically retrieved flash memory card prices, sales rank and product attributes from 
amazon.com on a daily basis. Finally, the flash memory cards product specification data were 
gathered from the official associations of each flash card format.  
The final dataset consists of 15,091 observations that cover all six major flash card formats 
and 45 major brands, with capacities ranging from 4MB to 8GB. As a result, we have a total of 
706 panels5 across 44 months. Each panel represent a format i, brand j, capacity k flash memory 
card sold during month t. The product level panels allow us to control for variation due to 
formats, capacities and brands, whereas the monthly level data allow us to control for variation 
due to any potential  “seasonal fluctuations” (i.e., sales surge during holidays, etc.) and time 
trends (i.e., declining costs, etc.). The distribution of observations, broken down by formats and 
year, is shown in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Distribution of Flash Memory Card Observations by Card Type/Year 
Card Type 2003 2004 2005 2006* Total (%) 
Compact Flash Card 1205 1309 1412 921 4847 (32.12%)
Memory Stick 334 453 492 343 1622 (10.75%)
Multimedia Card 317 360 453 267 1397 (9.26%)
Secure Digital Card 742 1063 1386 1251 4442 (29.43%)
Smart Media Card  583 461 387 200 1631 (10.81%)
xD Picture Card 190 264 385 313 1152 (7.63%)
Grand Total 3371 3910 4515 3295 15091 
* Note that 2006 observations only cover up to August, 2006
 
                                                 
4 NPD (www.npd.com) is a leading global research company. The firm provides critical consumer and retail market information 
based on data collected from point-of-sale (POS) terminals in major retailers across a range of outlets. 
5 Note that this is not a balanced panel due to the fact that some brands may only produce a type of flash memory cards at certain 
capacities and some flash memory card are discontinued after a certain period of time. 
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4.2. Variables 
Table 2 below provides definitions of the variables used in our analysis.  
Table 2: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
CardPricei,j,k,t deflated (in 2003 Q1 dollar) average retail price of a format i, brand j and capacity k flash 
memory card sold during month t. 
InstalledBase i,t percentage of the cumulative sales volume (in units) of format i flash cards as of month t  
ConverterAdoptiont Sales volume of digital converters relative to that of flash memory cards in month t 
Capacity capacity (in MB) of a flash memory card 
Speed average read/write speed of a flash memory card 
D_CF dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the Compact Flash format 
D_MS dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the Memory Stick format 
D_MMC dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the Multimedia Card format 
D_SD dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the Secure Digital format  
D_SM dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the SmartMedia format 
D_xD dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is compatible with the xD Picture Card format 
D_Brand j a “make effect” dummy variable, 1 if the flash memory card is manufactured by Firm j *  
D_Quarter q a seasonal effect dummy, 1 if the observation belongs to quarter q (q=1, 2, 3 or 4) 
D_Year y a year dummy, 1 if the observation belongs to year y (y=2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006) 
* Only brands with market share greater than 1% are selected.
The key variables for our analysis are price and the installed base of a flash memory card 
model, as well as the adoption level of converters. The flash memory card price, CardPricei,j,k,t, is 
computed as the deflated (in 2003 Q1 dollars) average retail price of a format i, brand j, capacity 
k flash memory cards sold during month t. The current installed base, InstalledBasei,t, is 
computed as the percentage of the cumulative units of the format i compatible flash memory 
cards sold by month t. The level of digital converter adoption, ConverterAdoptiont, is measured 
by the percentage of the unit sales volume of digital converters relative to the total flash memory 
cards sold during month t. Two product attribute variables, capacity and speed, are included as 
control variables to account for variations due to memory card size and product specifications. 
Other format specific product features are captured by the six format dummy variables. Finally, 
three other dummy variables are also created to control for brand, seasonal and year effects.  
Copyright ©2007 by Charles Liu. Please do not cite or distribute without authors’ permission.            9/28/2007                      14 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CardPricei,j,k,t 61.08 85.29 .01 1611.81 
InstalledBase i,t 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.48 
ConverterAdoptiont 0.65 0.13 0.35 0.78 
Capacity 420.74 804.97 4 8192 
Speed 20.68 15.04 1.3 40 
D_CF .32 .46 0 1 
D_MS .11 .28 0 1 
D_MMC .09 .30 0 1 
D_SD .29 .45 0 1 
D_SM .11 .31 0 1 
D_xD .76 .26 0 1 
D_Sandisk .12 .32 0 1 
D_Sony .036 .18 0 1 
D_Lexar .11 .31 0 1 
D_Pny .05 .21 0 1 
D_Fuji .06 .24 0 1 
D_Dane .025 .15 0 1 
D_Kingston .047 .21 0 1 
D_Kodak .029 .16 0 1 
D_Viking .047 .21 0 1 
D_Promaster .05 .22 0 1 
D_Spring .26 .44 0 1 
D_Summer .27 .45 0 1 
D_Fall .23 .42 0 1 
D_Winter .22 .41 0 1 
D_2003 .22 .42 0 1 
D_2004 .26 .44 0 1 
D_2005 .30 .46 0 1 
D_2006 .22 .41 0 1 
* Note that the means of the dummy variables represent the percentages of the observations, 
rather than the market share, of the corresponding dummy categories.  
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 and the correlations of the key variables are 
presented in Table 4.  As expected, two control variables, capacity and speed, are both positively 
correlated with flash memory card price. The other two key variables, flash memory card 
installed base and converter adoption, have opposite directions of correlation with flash memory 
card price (positive and negative, respectively). 
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Table 4: Correlations of Key Variables 
 CardPricei,j,k,t InstalledBase i,t ConverterAdoptiont Capacity Speed 
CardPricei,j,k,t 1.000     
InstalledBase i,t 0.056** 1.000    
ConverterAdoptiont -0.096** 0.010 1.000   
Capacity 0.637** 0.117** 0.237** 1.000  
Speed 0.192** 0.237** 0.011 0.231** 1.000 
*: p<5%; **: p<1%. 
5. Econometric Models, Estimation and Results 
We construct the following econometric model to test our hypotheses. Given that the effect 
of converters cannot be captured by the independent predictor of product price in the classic 
linear hedonic model framework, we test Hypotheses 1 through 3 by modifying the classic 
hedonic regression model to include an interaction term between installed base and the adoption 
of digital converters. 
i,tjit-1i,t-1
t-1i,t-1i,j,k,t
ε +Year +Brand+Format +Capacity +doptionConverterA*aseInstalledB
doptionConverterA+aseInstalledB+CardPrice
76543
210
ααααα
ααα +=
 
When the variable ConverterAdoption and its associated interaction term are both absent, the 
model reduces to a classic hedonic price regression where the coefficient α1 is expected to be 
positive and significant when there are strong network effects. However, when these two 
variables are included in the model, the main effect of the installed base is not solely captured by 
coefficient α1. Instead, the impact of the interacting variable also needs to be taken into account. 
More specifically, the main effect should be computed as the partial derivative of the dependent 
variable with respect to the variable of interest. Therefore, Hypothesis 1, which predicts that, 
ceteris paribus, a larger installed base will increase the price premium of a flash memory card 
even in the presence of a converter, can be evaluated as: 
,0+:H1 31 >=∂
∂
t-1
i,t-1
i,j,k,t doptionConverterA
aseInstalledB
CardPrice αα  when evaluating at the means of InstalledBasei,t-1 
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and ConverterAdoptiont-1. Similarly, Hypothesis 2, which predicts that the adoption of digital 
converters will lead to a flash card price premium, can be represented as: 
 ,0+:H2 32 >=∂
∂
i,t-1
t-1
i,j,k,t aseInstalledB
doptionConverterA
CardPrice αα  when evaluating at the means of InstalledBasei,t-1 
and ConverterAdoptiont-1. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3, which focuses on the interaction between the installed base and 
converters, can be tested by examining the significance level of coefficient α3, and by 
conducting an F-test on the restricted model (the one without the interaction term) and the 
unrestricted model (the one with the interaction term).  
We first estimate a restricted model (without the interaction term) and then include the 
interaction term in an unrestricted model to examine if the coefficient estimates and model fit 
statistics are sensitive to this specification change. Other variables in the restricted model include 
capacity and speed, as well as format, brand, and seasonal and year dummies. The brand 
dummies cover the top ten flash card brands in our dataset. The omitted dummy variables for the 
other categories are, for format, the Smartmedia format, for season, spring quarter, and for year, 
2003. Therefore, the constant term estimated in the model may be interpreted as the predicted 
price of a non-major brand Smartmedia card sold in the spring of 2003.   
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression results of both the restricted model and the 
unrestricted model are provided in Table 5 below. In the restricted model, the coefficient for 
InstalledBasei,t-1 is positive, and the coefficient for ConverterAdoptiont-1 is negative and only the 
latter is significant at the 1% level. When the interaction term is included into the restricted 
model, the signs of coefficients for both InstalledBasei,t-1 and ConverterAdoptiont-1 remain 
unchanged, but both become significant at the 1% level. The interaction term is negative and 
significant at the 1% level as well. Before we proceed to interpret the coefficients and test the 
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hypotheses, we also conduct several econometric adjustments to ensure that our results are robust 
to various specification errors and violations of OLS estimation assumptions. 
Table 5: Regression Results†♀  
Dependent Variable: CardPricei,j,k,t OLS Regression 
Restricted Model 
(No interaction) 
OLS Regression 
Unrestricted 
(Interaction) Model6 
GLS Estimation 
Interaction Model
Constant 34.691  
(3.34)** 
45.310  
(3.42)** 
43.005  
(3.47)** 
InstalledBasei,t-1 17.676  
(9.61)* 
83.543  
(10.84)** 
43.573  
(3.97)** 
ConverterAdoptiont-1 -35.450  
(11.45)** 
-41.677  
(11.40)** 
-20.323  
(1.96)** 
InstalledBase*ConverterAdoptiont-1  -514.728  
(39.99)** 
-190.87  
(14.48)** 
Adjusted R2 0.532  0.553 Log likelihood  
= –54658.9 
Fit Stat F(23, 15067) = 
747.9 
F(24, 15066) = 
761.47 
Wald χ2 (24) = 
12208.97 
† N=15,091, Ni=6, Nj=45, Nk=12, Nt=44 (706 panels across 44 months). 
♀ Standard errors in parentheses. *: p<5%; **: p<1%. 
Tests for Multicollinearity  
Due to the multiplicative nature of our model, the interaction term is highly correlated with 
the two variables from which it is computed. A multicollinearity check also reveals that the 
condition number of the interaction model and the variance inflation factors (VIF) values of the 
interaction term and the original variables are above the recommended threshold values of 20 
and 10, respectively (Greene 2003 pp. 57-58). Prior studies (Jaccard et al., 1990, Aiken and West, 
1991, pp 35-36) have suggested that with such models, the original interacting variables should 
be centered before computing other variables from them, which is done by subtracting the mean 
from every observation. After centering, the means of the centered variables are zero and the 
                                                 
6 As some of the literature on network effects considers a non-linear specification, we also added a squared term of the installed 
base into the model to examine whether the impact of converters is sensitive to the specification of network effects. The results 
indicate that the network effects increase at a faster rate as the size of the installed base increases (the coefficient estimate for the 
squared term is positive and significant at the 1% level), but the effects of converters on flash card prices are still qualitatively 
consistent with those obtained from the linear specification. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we report the results obtained 
from the linear specification of the network effectsmodel. 
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correlations between the interaction term and the original variables become much smaller. All 
VIF values drop below the threshold and the condition number reduces to an acceptable level of 
13.7. Therefore, after centering we can conclude that multicollinearity is not as salient in our 
interaction model7.  
Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation  
We use both graphical and non-graphical methods to detect heteroskedasticity. We first plot 
the residuals versus fitted (predicted) values (with a reference line at y=0). From this plot it can 
be observed that the pattern of the data points becomes wider the greater the X-axis value, which 
is an indication of heteroskedasticity. A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity yields a value of χ2(1) = 7027.54 (p<0.001), suggesting evidence of 
heteroskedasticity.  
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data shows that first-order 
autocorrelation (AR1) cannot be ruled out for our data set. This is not surprising given the 
longitudinal nature of our data. The presence of heteroskedasticity and AR1 autocorrelation 
invalidate the use of OLS (Greene, 2000, section 15.2.3). As both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are present in our dataset, we address both problems together by applying 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation procedures with corrections to adjust for both 
correlated heteroskedasticity and panel specific first-order autocorrelation. As shown in Table 5, 
our results are robust to these corrections. The interaction effect remains significant, and the 
directions of the estimated coefficients for both the interacting variables and the interaction term 
remain the same in the GLS regression, although the price increase effects brought by converters 
to minority formats are smaller compared to those obtained from the OLS regressions.  
                                                 
7 For ease of comparison, both InstalledBasei,t-1 and ConverterAdoptiont-1 are centered in the OLS regressions as well. 
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Main effects and interaction effect 
Given that the GLS estimator is more robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we 
examine both main effects and interaction effects using the results from the GLS estimation. 
First, to evaluate Hypotheses 1 and 2, in Table 6, we compute the main effects of the variables 
InstalledBase and ConverterAdoption at the means of the interacting variables and at 1 and 2 
standard deviation(s) above and below the means. Following Greene (2003, pp.124), the standard 
errors of these main effects can be computed from: 
],ˆ,ˆ[2]ˆ[)(]ˆ[)
],|[
( 31,3
2
,1
,
,,,, αααα CovaseInstalledBVaraseInstalledBVar
aseInstalledB
doptionConverterAaseInstalledBCardpriceE
Var titi
ti
ttitkji ++=∂
∂
 
and similarly for )],|[( ,,,,
t
ttitkji
doptionConverterA
doptionConverterAaseInstalledBCardpriceE
Var
∂ . Note that the standard errors of 
the main effects at different values can be obtained by substituting the respective variables with 
these different values in the above equations. These standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Table 6: Main Effects 
 -2 Std. Dev. -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev. +2 Std. Dev. 
InstalledBasei,t-1 93.48  
(3.35)** 
68.52  
(3.75)** 
43.57  
(3.97)** 
18.62  
(4.06)** 
-6.33  
(4.24)* 
ConverterAdoptiont-1 28.30  
(1.59)** 
3.99  
(1.72)** 
-20.32 
(1.96)** 
-44.64  
(2.31)** 
-68.95  
(2.49)** 
The first row in Table 6 shows that the main effect of the flash card installed base is 
generally positive (except when evaluated at +2 standard deviations above the average adoption 
level), indicating that network effects do exist in the flash memory card market, and providing 
support for Hypothesis 1. The second row shows that, even though the main effect of digital 
converter adoption is negative when evaluated at the average size of a flash memory card 
installed base (Mean column), it is positive for secondary flash card formats (-1 and -2 standard 
deviations columns) and the price premium is stronger for platforms with smaller market share.  
This suggests that Hypothesis 2 is supported for flash card formats with a relatively smaller 
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market share. For leading flash card formats the price increase effects are likely to be more than 
offset by the sharper price reduction effects due to the interaction between network effects and 
digital converters. 
With regard to Hypothesis 3, as shown in the first row in Table 6 flash card price premium 
changes in the expected direction. Digital converters reduce the price premium of the leading 
formats (i.e., those with a larger installed base) more than they do that of minority formats (i.e., 
those with a smaller installed base). Moreover, coefficient α3 is highly significant (p<0.001) in 
the interaction model. An F-test between the restricted model and the unrestricted model also 
confirms that the inclusion of the interaction term significantly contributes to the explanation of 
the variance in the hedonic regression. Therefore, we conclude that Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Test for Endogeneity  
One possible concern about these results is that one of the independent variables, 
InstalledBase, is the cumulative unit sales volume of a flash memory card format. This variable 
could be closely correlated with the current period unit sales volume of a flash memory card 
format, which, in turn, could be correlated with our dependent variable, the current period flash 
memory card price. To address this potential endogeneity in our model, we use the lagged (t–1) 
cumulative market share as our measure for the installed base and perform a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) estimation to test for endogeneity. We use the cumulative market share with two 
months lag as our instrumental variable. Following Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) we 
tested for endogeneity in our augmented form using a generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
estimation with specifications for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity8. The results from the 
GMM estimation are consistent with those obtained from the OLS and the GLS estimation. 
                                                 
8 The same approach is also adopted in Mittal and Nault (2006) in which they face a similar situation. 
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Neither a Wu-Hausman F test (p-value = 0.48) nor a Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test (p-
value=0.47) could reject the null hypothesis that the lagged cumulative market share is 
exogenous. This provides confidence in our results against potential endogeneity concerns.  
6. Discussion  
The overarching question in this study is why, despite the apparent benefits of product 
compatibility in the flash memory card market, there has been little convergence to a dominant 
standard. Our findings provide important insights that help to answer this question.  
First, we find that the presence of digital converters has a strong effect on standards 
competition by offsetting some of the impact of network effects. As shown in Table 6, in markets 
characterized with network effects, the presence of converters weakens the relationship between 
installed base and price premia. The overall main effect of converters on prices is negative at the 
mean value of the flash card installed base and is positive only for flash memory card formats 
with an installed base below the average. For a flash card format with a smaller installed base 
(i.e. 2 standard deviations below the mean), a 1% increase in the adoption level of digital 
converters raises the flash card premium by $.23. But, this price premium disappears when a 
format’s installed base is close to the industry average. This finding is still consistent with our 
predictions and can be explained intuitively. A converter serves as tool for data exchange 
between the otherwise incompatible flash card formats. Such a converter is relatively more 
valuable for consumers who own a minority format as it allows them to communicate with 
consumers of a much larger network. Hence the utility gain, and consequently the willingness to 
pay for a higher price, is larger for consumers of the minority formats than those of the dominant 
formats.  
In addition to the differential impact of converters on consumers who belong to different 
Copyright ©2007 by Charles Liu. Please do not cite or distribute without authors’ permission.            9/28/2007                      22 
networks, several other factors may also account for the overall price reduction that is attributed 
to digital converters. For example, flash memory card vendors can also profit from the sales of 
digital converters. If a vendor is engaged in the sales of both converters and flash cards (which is 
not uncommon in the flash memory card market) the vendor can transfer some of the price 
premium from the flash memory cards to the sales of digital converters and still profit overall. 
Consumers who buy the flash cards at a lower price enjoy more consumer surplus and are 
therefore more willing to pay for a converter to gain some additional benefit.  In addition, some 
vendors do not produce their own converters, but license a third party vendor to do so. In this 
case, the licensing fee can more than compensate for the loss due to flash card price reduction.   
However, it is also important to note that while network effects are weakened with the 
adoption of digital converters, the effects are not fully eliminated. This implies that a larger 
installed base is still a competitive advantage over other competing formats. This advantage is 
more significant as a format’s installed base grows. All else being equal, a 1% increase in the 
installed base of a flash card format can give rise to $.43 price premium (a 0.705% price increase) 
of a compatible flash memory card9. It is also important to note that the strength of network 
effects, as represented by the price premium, is very sensitive to the adoption of digital 
converters. When the level of digital converters adoption is relatively low, i.e. at one standard 
deviation below the mean, the price premium increases by more than 50% to $.69. However, 
when the adoption of digital converters is high, i.e., at one standard deviation above the mean, 
such a price premium almost disappears. 
Finally, when the market share advantage of the leading standards is weakened as converters 
are widely adopted, market competition will escalate.  In light of such fierce competition the 
                                                 
9 This is of a similar order of magnitude price premium of $.97 (a 0.753% price increase) found in the spreadsheet market 
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996). 
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dominant firms might use a price war as a tool to deter potential entrants and to drive the 
secondary formats out of the market, as the short-term incentive to seize market share may 
dominate the long-term profit maximization goal. Hence, we observe a negative price premium 
for these dominant formats.  
To illustrate the interaction between network effects (installed base) and the adoption of 
digital converters, we illustrate the results from Table 6 in Figures 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3: Price premium of a type of flash card at ±2      Figure 4: Price premium of a type of flash card at ±2 
standard deviation of the mean converter adoption level  standard deviation of the mean flash card installed base 
 
In Figure 3 the x-axis denotes the adoption level of digital converters and the y-axis 
represents the price premium of a type of flash card. The dashed, dotted, and solid lines represent 
the price premium of a flash card format with a large (+2 standard deviations), average, and 
small (–2 standard deviations) market share respectively. Figure 3 shows that the price premium 
of a flash card format with a larger installed base decreases as the adoption of digital converters 
increases, whereas the price premium of a flash card format with a smaller installed base 
increases as the adoption of digital converters increases, suggesting that there is a negative 
interaction effect between the installed base of the flash card format and the sales of digital 
converters. In other words, the adoption of digital converters has a completely opposite impact 
on majority and minority flash memory card formats. A similar interaction is depicted in Figure 
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4 in which the x-axis denotes the installed base of a flash memory card format and the y-axis 
represents the price premium of that type of flash memory card. The dashed, dotted, and solid 
lines represent the price premium of a flash card format when the adoption of digital converters 
is high (+2 standard deviations), average, and low (–2 standard deviations) respectively. One can 
see that network effects are present (upward slope of price premium curve) only when the 
adoption level of digital converters is below a certain level. When there is extensive adoption of 
digital converters (i.e., above +2 standard deviations), network effects have only a minimal 
impact on the market (downward slope of the price premium curve). 
In addition to moderating the impact of installed base on product prices, our findings also 
suggest that digital converters also have the potential to change the nature of competition in the 
flash memory card market. As converters prevail, the market share gap among various 
competing formats is likely to be reduced. Consequently, buyers’ expectations are more likely to 
hinge on other product attributes and competition will arise in other dimensions, such as quality 
and performance. Leading formats can no longer rely on their large installed base to deter new 
entrants and suppress competition as such a competitive advantage is like to be eroded over time 
as converters become widely available. In contrast to the self-reinforcing loop in classic network 
effects theory, with the presence of digital converters the larger the leading format’s installed 
base, the more such a benefit can be appropriated among consumers of the minority formats, 
creating an opposite feedback loop that pushes the market towards the minimization of market 
consolidation. Under such a competitive environment, a standards competition characterized 
with extensive adoption of converters is likely to undergo a more unpredictable growth path. As 
is representative in the flash memory card market, the new entrant formats have been 
outperforming the incumbent formats since the market was launched. Nevertheless, what is 
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predictable is the growing attention to the role of digital converters. Since their debut in the 
market in early 2000s, two variants of the Secure Digital (SD) format, MicroSD and MiniSD 
cards, have all come with free converters to the SD format, allowing them to take full advantage 
of the SD cards’ large installed base. This action was quickly followed by Sony, the major 
retailer of Memory Stick cards, who announced a worldwide initiative to promote its Memory 
stick card reader to be installed on a variety of laptops and desktops. Today, more and more PC 
manufacturers are including flash memory card readers as a standard component on their PCs, 
suggesting increasing consensus among different market participants about the prospect and 
importance of digital conversion. 
 From a societal standpoint our findings also have important implications for technology 
innovation and adoption. In many IT industries when the market cannot settle on an industry-
wide technology standard, both consumers and content providers (or application developers) will 
choose to postpone their investment until the market is clear about which standard to adopt. But, 
this delay in adoption results in even more uncertainty about the future of the technology. Such a 
dilemma repeats itself in each standards war and is illustrated in the well-publicized battle 
between Blu-Ray and HD-DVD, the two rival formats for the next generation high definition 
DVD. With about an equal number of supporters from the multimedia industry, both formats 
claim themselves as the next dominant standard in the high definition DVD market. However, 
consumers are skeptical about the time it takes for the market to unveil the winning technology. 
Given the high switching costs involved the sales of either format DVD players have been 
disappointing despite huge advertising efforts, further extending the period of intransient 
incompatibility. However, if a digital converter were available to convert data from the 
incompatible DVD discs to a form that can be mutually accepted, consumers would be more 
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willing to embrace the new technology as the risk of being stranded on either technology is 
minimized. Once the excess inertia among stragglers is overcome, technology adoption will 
accelerate and lead itself into a traditional evolutionary path.  
7. Conclusions and Future Research 
The implications of network effects have been widely discussed in the academic literature 
and in the popular press. However, most illustrations of networks effects are drawn from existing 
“physical” or “analog” environments. Our contention is that the unique characteristics of digital 
environments may alter some of the conventional wisdom about network effects and their 
competitive implications.  
In this study, we illustrate some of these issues in the context of the flash memory market, 
where in spite of apparent network effects, there are multiple competing standards and little 
evidence of market consolidation. Specifically, we apply a modified hedonic regression to an 
extensive dataset cataloging prices and sales of flash memory modules and flash memory 
converters. Our findings yield several ex post intuitive, but important insights into digital goods 
markets characterized with network effects. Extensive adoption of digital converters is found to 
reduce the magnitude of network effects, as seen by a reduced price premium of the leading flash 
format. As a result, new standards are more likely to attract customers than in the absence of 
digital converters. These findings explain the seemingly counter-intuitive trend of the lack of 
standards convergence currently seen in the flash memory card market, and also shed light on the 
evolution of standards competition in other, similar “digital” product markets. 
The rich dynamic in the flash memory card market also raises several interesting questions 
for future research. When firms can supply both the flash memory cards and digital converters, 
how they exercise their pricing strategies in both markets is of particular interest to both 
researchers and practitioners. Moreover, although proprietary standards prevailed in the early 
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stage of the flash memory card market, upon the advent of the digital converters, several 
proprietary standard owners began to reach cross-licensing agreements and promoted ease of 
conversion between competing formats.10 This is considered a strategic move to take advantage 
of the introduction of digital converters and to cope with the perceived fierce competition in the 
future. Although we have demonstrated the rationale behind such moves, the actual impact on 
firms’ profits merits future empirical examination. Finally, both social welfare and private 
surplus are likely to be affected by the introduction of conversion technologies. Further studies to 
quantify these impacts will provide important guidance for policy makers concerned about the 
nature and consequences of new technology adoption and innovation in markets characterized 
with network effects and the possibility of digital conversion. 
                                                 
10 e.g., SanDisk has been selling SanDisk-branded Memory Stick products since 2001 and is a co-developer with Sony of 
Memory Stick Pro, and Sony has supplied a card-reader on its laptops that can read SanDisk’s SD cards since 2003. 
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